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I. INTRODUCTION
In the waning years of the twentieth century, an influential
court announced a radical change in contract formation theory!
What has been labeled the "rolling" or "layered" theory proved
highly controversial. Analyses of the two Seventh Circuit opinions
creating the theory have revealed several of its analytical defects,
but other flaws and their unintended effects have not been em-
phasized. Suggestions that subsequent cases have installed the
rolling theory as the prevailing view2 are, at the least, premature.
The case law progeny reveals pervasive confusion and inconsistent
results. Beyond holdings rejecting the theory, opinions that dis-
tinguish their facts leave substantial questions as to its potential
application unanswered. Without any reference to the theory,
contrary holdings make it difficult to discern its current status in
a given jurisdiction. The underlying purpose of the theory is the
"efficacy" of form contracting,3 but even that alleged benefit is
questionable. Commentators generally agree that the theory ig-
nores statutory language and precedent.4
The majority of jurisdictions have not had the opportunity to de-
cide the fate of the rolling theory. It is important to pursue a de-
finitive analysis to facilitate future decisions concerning its appli-
cation or rejection. Part I revisits the theory, its origins, and con-
* Chancellor & Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1.See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (creating and affirming the theory in two opinions, both writ-
ten by Judge Frank Easterbrook for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals).
2. Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bar-
gaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2010) (suggesting that, apparently, the theory has
been accepted "despite the objections of law professors").
3. Peter Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 505, 523 (2008)
(suggesting that "[Judge] Easterbrook's argument is an argument from efficacy, not from
Contract theory or even, it would seem, from Contract law").
4. See id. 508 n.16, 512 n.32. A notable exception to the critics is found in a commen-
tary applauding the theory and viewing its author, Judge Easterbrook, as a creative writer
of opinions in the tradition of the great Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. Posner, supra
note 2, at 1193.
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troversial analyses. Part II examines the often confusing and am-
biguous case law progeny of the theory to demonstrate the fallacy
that it constitutes a prevailing view. Part III suggests an econom-
ic dimension different from the economic justification for the
theory. Part IV places the theory within the generic, underlying,
and perpetual problem of the effect courts should afford to unread,
standardized boilerplate terms. Part V reviews possible solutions,
Part VI focuses upon a workable solution, and Part VII concludes
with a recommendation concerning the future of the rolling
theory.
II. THE ROLLING CONTRACT THEORY-CONCEPT, ORIGINS,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, AND PRECEDENT
A. Contract Terms Revealed Before or After Delivery of Goods-
The "Rolling Formation" Concept
Under traditional contract theory, where a buyer has an oppor-
tunity to review a vendor's standardized terms before contracting
and chooses to ignore them, absent fraud, duress, or unconsciona-
bility, the terms will be enforced under the proverbial "duty to
read" rule.' Where the vendor's terms become available only after
the purchase of the product ("terms later") and include additional
terms that had not been previously negotiated or discussed, courts
may treat such later terms as totally inoperative.6 In a contract
for the sale of goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), additional terms in a post-purchase confirmation of the
contract that materially alter the original terms are inoperative.7
Under the rolling theory, however, where the terms are deli-
vered with the goods inside the box, such additional, post-
purchase terms are operative, and section 2-207 of the UCC is
deemed "irrelevant" for reasons that contradict statutory language
and precedent.8 The effect is to postpone the formation of the con-
tract until the buyer has an opportunity to review the terms and
decide whether such terms are acceptable.9 A timely objection to
the additional terms rejects them and allows a refund of any
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 cmt. b (1981). The failure to read
terms to which a party apparently assents does not affect their operative effect. Id. One is
bound by the appearance of mutual assent, even if it was unintended. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
7. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2003).
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See infra Part I.C.
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amount already paid." If, however, the buyer does not object
within the period specified in the seller's terms, the terms become
part of the contract through the buyer's silence." This is the final
"layer" in contract formation, regardless of any conscious assent to
the later terms. 2
B. Origins-ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Later Terms
The generally accepted analysis of contract formation in self-
service transactions views the store as the seller making the offer
and the buyer as the offeree who accepts the offer by taking pos-
session of the product. 3 The custom of allowing the customer to
return the product to the shelf creates an implied power of termi-
nation in the customer. 4 This analysis is justified under the offer
and acceptance section of the UCC." In a leading case, bottles
containing soda exploded in the buyer's hand as the bottles were
removed from the shelf."s The acceptance of the store's offer to sell
occurred when the buyer took possession of the bottles. 7 At that
moment, a contract for sale was formed, meeting a threshold re-
quirement of the implied warranty of merchantability, which re-
quires a contract for sale to exist." Had the contract not been
formed until the buyer paid for the goods at the checkout station,
the implied warranty of merchantability would not have attached
when the injury occurred. In another case, the buyer took candy
from a display and bit into it, and foreign matter in the candy
caused injury. 9 Again, a contract was formed when the buyer took
possession of the product, and the implied warranty of merchan-
tability attached at the moment of formation."0
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, a buyer of software took a box con-
taining the discs from a shelf of a self-service store, paid the price,
and left the store with his purchase.2" Inside the box, a "user
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871-73 (Okla. 1979).
14. Barker, 596 P.2d at 872-73.
15. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2003).
16. Barker, 596 P.2d at 871.
17. Id. at 873.
18. Id. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (requiring that a contract for sale exist between a buyer
and a seller who is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold in the store in order
for a warranty of merchantability to be implied).
19. Gentry v. Hershey Co., 687 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
20. Gentry, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
21. 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
Vol. 50
Rolling Contract Theory
guide" included license terms that stated restrictions limiting the
use of the software to non-commercial purposes," and program
screens warned that use is limited to a single user for individual
or personal use.23 An inconspicuous notice was printed on the out-
side stating that there were license terms inside the package.24
Ignoring the inside terms that were also splashed on the computer
screen when he ran the program, the buyer copied the subject
matter of the discs, which was millions of telephone numbers from
telephone directories that could not be copyrighted, and estab-
lished his own corporation in competition with the producer of the
software."
The district court found that a contract was formed when the
buyer took the goods from the shelf pursuant to the general forma-
tion section of the UCC, section 2-204, which permits a contract to
be formed in any reasonable manner.26 The court also found a va-
lid contract pursuant to the more specific offer and acceptance sec-
tion, 2-206, recognizing that any reasonable manner of acceptance
may be employed to form a contract, unless the offer unambi-
guously requires a particular manner of acceptance. 27  Treating
the buyer as a consumer rather than as a merchant, the court con-
cluded that the buyer could not be bound by post-purchase terms
inside the box without expressly assenting to them under UCC
section 2-207(2).28 An alternate analysis treating the additional
terms as an offer for a subsequent modification contract under
section 2-209 would also require the buyer's express assent, which
never occurred.29
The district court relied on a Third Circuit case, Step-Saver Da-
ta Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology," where a buyer telephoned
offers for software, which the seller accepted.3' The buyer followed
22. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
23. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 645 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
25. Id. at 1449-50.
26. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652.
27. Id. at 651-52.
28. Id. at 655.
29. Id. The district court cited the leading case in support of that analysis, Barker v.
Allied Supermarket. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651-52 (citing Barker v. Allied Supermarket,
596 P.2d 870, 872 (Okla. 1979)). Even if the offer was not accepted until the buyer paid for
the goods (a view supported by an English case, Pharm. Soc'y of Gr. Brit. v. Boots Cash
Chemists (S.) Ltd., (1953) 1 Q.B. 401, 403-04, perhaps to avoid criminal prosecutions), the
contract was certainly formed no later than the time of payment at the checkout station.
30. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
31. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 95-96.
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this oral agreement with a purchase order.32 The seller then
shipped software with an invoice repeating the terms the parties
had discussed.33 The product, however, arrived in a package on
which license terms that the parties had not discussed were
printed ("box-top license").34 The terms stated that the buyer had
only purchased "a personal, non-transferable license to use the
program," that all express and implied warranties were dis-
claimed, and that the sole remedy was the replacement of defec-
tive discs.35 The terms concluded with:
Opening this package indicates your acceptance of these
terms and conditions. If you do not agree with them, you
should promptly return the package unopened to the person
from whom you purchased it within fifteen days from date of
purchase and your money will be refunded to you by that per-
36son.
The seller argued that the contract was not formed until the
buyer received the product, saw the license terms, and opened the
package. 37 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that the con-
tract had been formed prior to the sending of the package and that
the terms printed on the package constituted additional terms in
confirmation of the previously formed contract." Under UCC sec-
tion 2-207(1), a contract had been formed notwithstanding such
additional terms in the confirmation (box top license)Y.3  The dis-
claimer of warranties and limitation of remedies were additional
terms that did not become part of the contract since they were
deemed to be material alterations of the contract under section 2-
207(2)(b).4 °
C. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg in the Seventh Circuit
On ProCD's appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
attempted to distinguish the Step-Saver case in confronting the
challenge of determining the enforceability of terms not previously
32. Id. at 96.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 96-97.
36. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 97.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 100, 105-06.
39. Id. at 103.
40. Id. at 105-06.
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disclosed, which are delivered with the product.' Though it stated
the basic proposition that "[o]ne cannot agree to hidden terms," it
quickly added that an inconspicuous, small-print statement on the
outside of the ProCD package could be said to have incorporated
the terms inside. 2 Requiring sellers to include microscopic print
of all terms on the outside of a package would be impractical.43
Though the notice was inconspicuous, the court concluded that
"[niotice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return
the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right
that the license expressly extends) may be a means of doing busi-
ness valuable to buyers and sellers alike."' Had the court rested
its holding on this notice, albeit inconspicuous, the decision would
have barely raised eyebrows. After all, the court was confronted
with an unsympathetic defendant who took the work product of
the plaintiff." Theorists could find solace in the court's quotable
phrase, "notice on the outside, terms on the inside," and view this
incorporation phrase on the outside of the ProCD package under
these facts as sufficient to alert a buyer to detailed license terms
inside, albeit winking at the inconspicuousness of the notice. Such
a holding could have been viewed as only a justifiable aberration
from traditional contract theory. The court, however, pursued a
much broader analysis for its holding and, just months later,
would even reject any requirement of any notice on the outside of
a package. 6
The court insisted that there was nothing unusual in "terms
later" transactions, such as insurance policies or airline tickets,
containing terms that the buyer had an opportunity to see only
after the purchase,47 but it failed to note that these illustrations
involved regulated industries requiring oversight of such terms.
41. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). The court also de-
scribed "shrinkwrap" licenses, where the terms are printed on the tight plastic or cello-
phane covering the delivered product. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. Some vendors, but not
ProCD, would claim that the license terms become effective when the plastic is torn from
the package. Id.
42. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
43. Id. at 1451.
44. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)) (extolling the
efficiencies of standardized agreements).
45. See id. at 1450.
46. See Hillv. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
47. ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1450.
48. Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1823-24 (2000). Braucher noted that:
Judge Easterbrook claimed that delayed disclosure is a long-standing, accepted con-
tract practice, citing insurance and airline tickets as examples. But these are exam-
Winter 2012
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The court relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,49 which upheld a forum
selection clause that was part of the printed boilerplate on a cruise
line ticket." The court failed, however, to note the express "boun-
daries" of that decision, where Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, stated that "we do not address the question whether res-
pondents had sufficient notice of the forum clause before entering
the contract for passage. Respondents essentially have conceded
that they had notice of the forum-selection provision." " Unlike
the case before the Seventh Circuit, the only question in Shute
was whether such a forum selection clause was required to be the
product of negotiation, and not simply whether the respondents
were aware of the clause before the contract was formed.52 This
error, however, was insignificant compared to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's assertions concerning UCC section 2-207.
The Seventh Circuit's startling holding appeared in its attempt
to distinguish the Step-Saver case on which the District Court had
relied.53 Since there were two forms and a box-top license confir-
mation with additional terms in Step-Saver, the court stated that
"[o]ur case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant."5 4 Thus,
with no further analysis or any mention of precedent, the court
simply announced the stark conclusion that section 2-207 applies
only where there are two forms.55 It was presented as fiat in the
teeth of the statute, which recognizes that "[a] definite and sea-
sonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance . . .. ,6 A con-
firmation is not a traditional acceptance of an offer, but section 2-
ples of regulated industries, not dependent on market discipline to prevent unfair-
ness. In the case of insurance, regulators typically have the responsibility of review-
ing and approving policy terms. In addition, often state law provides for a required
disclosure form setting forth key policy terms. In the case of airline tickets, most of
the material in the ticket is dictated by U.S. Department of Transportation regula-
tions requiring waivers of liability limits provided for in the Warsaw Convention, and
by federal regulations dealing with overbooking and liability for baggage loss.
Id.
49. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
50. Shute, 499 U.S. at 493-95.
51. Id. at 590.
52. Id. at 590-91.
53. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
54. ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1452.
55. Id.
56. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2003) (emphasis added). Although it is common to refer to sec-




207(1) accords it the operative effect of an acceptance. It is abun-
dantly clear that a single confirmation of an existing oral contract
may contain different or additional terms requiring the applica-
tion of section 2-207. Beyond the statutory language that refers to
"a" single confirmation, a comment in the UCC explains that the
section was designed to deal with two typical situations. The
first typical situation "is the written confirmation, where an
agreement has been reached, either orally or by informal corres-
pondence and is followed by one or both of the parties sending
formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon
and adding terms not discussed."58 Thus, the first illustration of a
situation giving rise to section 2-207 recognizes an oral contract
followed by either a single confirmation from one of the parties
containing different or additional terms or confirmations from
both parties with non-matching terms. Comment 2 is even more
direct:
Under this Article, a proposed deal which in commercial un-
derstanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a con-
tract. Therefore, any additional matter contained in the con-
firmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and
must be regarded as a proposal for an added term unless the
acceptance is made conditional on the acceptance of the addi-
tional or different term. 9
The comments do not require "battling" confirmations. The first
comment refers to "a confirmation" and the second refers to "the
confirmation."60 Not only did the court fail to address these points;
it also failed to address diametrically opposed precedent, including
its own.
In Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann Construction Spe-
cialties, Inc., McCann was the largest distributor of Advance
products in the Chicago area, with purchases amounting to
$700,000 annually.61 The purchases were typically initiated by
phone calls or orders taken in person by an Advance representa-
57. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 1.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). See also Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Green-
wich Metals, Inc., No. 07-2252-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 121343, at *19 (D. Kan. Dec. 30,
2009); Glyptal, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887, 894 (D. Mass. 1992).
60. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1.




tive visiting McCann.62 Advance sent invoices to McCann within
seven days of each purchase.63 The typical invoice contained a
provision requiring payment within thirty days and a finance
charge of one and one half percent interest each month for pay-
ments after thirty days-an "'[annual percentage rate of 18%. "64
McCann claimed it never negotiated or agreed to such an interest
rate.65 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that
the invoice constituted a confirmation of the contract which con-
tained an additional term subject to UCC section 2-207(2)(b); the
court then had to determine whether the finance charge term ma-
terially altered the previously formed contract.66
The court explained that delivery occurred through common
carriers and that "[aidvance's usual billing procedure was to send
an invoice to McCann within seven days of McCann's purchases."6 7
The invoice was not packaged with the product.66 It was sent sep-
arately, after the goods were shipped.69 Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit held that section 2-207 applies where the transaction in-
volves only one form,7" a holding that is diametrically opposed to
the holding on this issue in ProCD, which requires two forms for
any application of section 2-207. 7'
In Rocheux International, Inc. v. US. Merchants Financial
Group, Inc., the Advance opinion is included in the court's discus-
sion of a "considerable split of authority" as to whether a docu-
ment arriving after or with the delivery of goods qualifies as a
"written confirmation" under section 2-207.7' The Rocheux court
first reviewed cases holding that section 2-207 does not apply
where an invoice is sent after the goods have been shipped, 73 but
62. Advance, 916 F.2d at 413.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 414.
66. Id. at 416-17 (citing U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (2003)). Pursuant to official comment 5
of section 2-207, which contains illustrations of terms that are not material alterations, the
court concluded that such a finance charge provision did not materially alter the previous
oral contract. Id. at 415-16. Thus, it became part of the contract. Id. at 416.
67. Advance, 916 F.2d at 413.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 416-17.
71. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. Rocheux Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 678 (D.N.J.
2010).
73. Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl 0. Helm
Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1984); Wheaton Glass v. Pharmax,
Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D.N.J. 1982)).
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the effect of such holdings is totally different from the rolling con-
tract effect. These courts held that they would not consider
whether an additional term could become part of the contract un-
der section 2-207, because the contract was already formed before
the additional terms were received."4 Thus, any additional term
must be inoperative.75 In one of these cases, the court noted that,
had the billing form containing the additional term been sent with
the goods, section 2-207(2) would apply to test whether the addi-
tional term materially altered the prior oral agreement. 6
The Rocheux court compared those cases with others
representing what it deemed to be the majority view, and cited a
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, which held that an invoice
included with the shipment contained an additional term that
would have to be tested under section 2-207."7 The court then
cited the Seventh Circuit's Advance opinion interpreting Wiscon-
sin law in holding that a single document (invoice) sent after the
goods were shipped would require the application of section 2-
207.78 The court did not compare that holding with ProCD which,
again, dismisses such an application of section 2-207.
Apart from the rolling theory, the extant case law holds, in de-
termining whether the single document containing additional
terms arrives with or after the goods, that either section 2-
207(2)(b) applies to determine whether the additional term is ma-
terial or that section 2-207 does not apply, thereby precluding any
additional term, material or immaterial, from becoming part of the
contract. Without explanation or any reference to precedent, the
Seventh Circuit's rolling theory rejects both views. It concludes
that section 2-207 does not apply, but, absent a timely objection
from the buyer, the contract includes the additional terms regard-
less of their material effect on parties' prior understanding.79 The
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Wheaton Glass, 548 F. Supp. at 1244-45.
77. Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mex-
icanos, 934 F.2d 635, 654 (5th Cir. 1991)).
78. Id. at 678. The court also cited other cases supporting the view that section 2-207
applied where the writing was delivered after the goods were shipped: McJunkin, Corp. v.
Mechs., Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 487 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Ohio's Uniform Commercial Code);
Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1122-24 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Mississippi's Uniform Commercial Code); Sudenga Indus. v. Fulton Performance Products,
Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (applying Iowa's Uniform Commercial
Code); Herzog Oil Field Serv. v. Otto Torpedo Co., 570 A.2d 549, 550-51 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(applying Pennsylvania's Uniform Commercial Code). Id. at 678.
79. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
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application of section 2-207 to cases involving a single confirma-
tion previously had been clearly recognized in the Seventh Circuit
and elsewhere.
The ukase that section 2-207 does not apply where only one
form contains different or additional terms has been universally
criticized. Since commentators find absolutely no redeeming vir-
tue in this assertion, they are relegated to the only apt and une-
quivocal characterization: that its "wrong."80
D. Avoiding Relevant U.C.C. Contract Formation Concepts
While recognizing that "the district judge was right to say that a
contract can be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price
and walking out of the store," the court quickly added that "the
UCC permits contracts to be formed in other ways."8' Here, the
court appears to view the U.C.C. as a smorgasbord of sections
from which a court may choose one section to support its desired
result, while ignoring others. It relies exclusively on the general
contract formation section, section 2-204(1), which states that "[a]
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recog-
nizes the existence of such a contract."8 2 It treats this general lan-
guage as allowing it to create a new formation theory: "[a] vendor,
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may
propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes accep-
tance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor pro-
poses to treat as acceptance.3
Under the new theory, the contract was not formed when the
buyer took the box from the shelf, or even when he paid the price
80. Critical analyses of judicial or scholarly views typically consider arguments and
rationales on either side of the issue. Here, however, the Seventh Circuit's view is a fiat for
which commentators can find no basis whatsoever. They conclude that the court is simply
"wrong" in this regard. For example, "[w]hen Judge Easterbrook in ProCD states that
Section 2-207 does not apply to transactions that involve only one document, he is plainly
wrong." James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting Out, 48 LOY.
L. REV. 53, 81 (2002). Also, Robert A. Hillman stated that "Easterbrook was plainly wrong
about Section 2-207's applicability." Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 743, 752 (2002). But see Marc. L. Roark, Limitation of Sales Warranties as an Alter-
native to Intellectual Property Rights: An Empirical Analysis of iPhone Warranties' Deter-
rent Impact on Consumers, 2010 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 35 n.62 (2010) (characterizing
Judge Easterbrook's statement as "a little cavalier").
81. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.




and left the store with the discs. 4 Rather it was formed only when
he had an opportunity to review the terms inside the box that
were also splashed on the computer screen.85 By retaining the
product without objection to the terms within the time allowed by
the seller for objection, his silence was said to manifest acceptance
of the offer, forming the contract for the first time.86 If, as the
court suggested, the district judge was not wrong in recognizing a
contract when the buyer paid and left the store with the product,87
why does the Seventh Circuit insist that it will only recognize a
postponed acceptance? The court answers that ProCD proposed
this "different way" of accepting its offer, thereby mandating a
unique manner of acceptance. The court's analysis exposes a ma-
jor flaw.
The U.C.C. continues the fundamental precept that the offeror
is the master of the offer, but it qualifies that precept. 9 While the
district court was careful to include not only the general formation
section of the U.C.C. in its analysis (section 2-204(1)), but also the
more specific U.C.C. section on "Offer and Acceptance in Contract
Formation" (section 2-206(1)),9o the Seventh Circuit studiously
avoids any mention of the more specific section. Recognition
would have been fatal to its new theory, since the opening phrase
of the omitted section undermines the court's analysis. It states
that "[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language
or circumstances, an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
under the circumstances."9
Section 2-206 made an important change in the common law of
contract formation that was later incorporated in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.2 Unlike their predecessors, the underlying
assumption in both the U.C.C. and the Restatement Second is that
the typical offer is indifferent as to how the offeree chooses to ac-
cept it: either by promising or performing, unless the offeror de-
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (2003).
90. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651-52 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
91. U.C.C. § 2-206.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30(2) (1981).
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mands a particular manner of acceptance.93 Under section 2-206,
unless the offeror unambiguously demands a particular manner of
acceptance, the offeree may accept in any reasonable manner."
By suggesting that the district court's analysis was not wrong, but
that there are other ways in which a contract may be formed,95 the
court is suggesting that any reasonable manner of acceptance
would be effective, including the district court's analysis or its own
analysis that formation did not occur until later. The different
analyses, however, produce diametrically opposite results.
Moreover, the court has eliminated the possibility of "any rea-
sonable manner of acceptance" by its holding that the seller in this
case was unambiguously demanding a particular manner of accep-
tance, i.e., a postponed acceptance available only after the buyer
possessed the product without objection, for the time stated in the
hidden terms. Where an offer unambiguously requires only a sin-
gle manner of acceptance, section 2-206 mandates that exclusive
manner of acceptance.96 The Seventh Circuit must avoid any men-
tion of section 2-206, because the test of whether a vendor unam-
biguously requires a particular manner of acceptance is whether a
reasonable buyer-offeree should have clearly understood that only
one manner of acceptance would form a contract.97 Thus, to be
faithful to section 2-206, the court would have had to conclude
that a buyer of any product in a self-service store unambiguously
understood that the only manner in which this offer could be ac-
cepted was by the hitherto nonexistent manner of acceptance pre-
scribed by the court-where the buyer is bound by the terms that
become visible only after they are discovered inside the box. The
court does not even attempt to justify that characterization since
the typical buyer would assume a contract has been formed no
later than when he paid for the product and left the store with it.
It was necessary to avoid any reference to section 2-206 because
that would have undermined its new contract formation theory.
Either this highly sophisticated court did not understand the con-
tract formation sections of the U.C.C., or it chose to ignore them.
The former explanation taxes credulity.
93. Id. § 30(2) cmt. d.
94. U.C.C. § 2-206. This fundamental change from the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS is analyzed in John E. Murray, Jr., Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement
Process, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 785 (1968).
95. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
96. U.C.C. § 2-206.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30(2) cmt. b, d.
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E. Confirming and Extending the Theory-Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc.
The court's crisp statement of the facts and issue in this case
cannot be improved:
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives
a credit card number. Presently a box arrives, containing the
computer and a list of terms, said to govern unless the cus-
tomer returns the computer within 30 days. Are these terms
effective as the parties' contract, or is the contract term-free
because the order-taker did not read any terms over the
phone and elicit the customer's assent?98
The Hills kept the computer for more than thirty days before
claiming it was defective.99 Gateway responded by seeking to en-
force an arbitration clause that appeared as one of the terms in-
side the box. °° The district court refused to compel arbitration,
because it viewed the record as insufficient to find a valid arbitra-
tion clause between the parties or that the Hills had been given
adequate notice of such a clause.'0 '
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Hills' request to lim-
it the ProCD precedent to contracts for software since "ProCD is
about the law of contract, not the law of software." 2 It restated
the "duty to read" proverb: people who accept an offer assume the
risk of unread terms that may prove unwelcome. 3 Restating the
"duty to read" to determine the enforceability of terms not availa-
ble to be read at the time a reasonable party assumes the contract
has been formed, however, is not particularly persuasive. The
court simply concluded that Gateway shipped the computer "with
the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to users of its
software."'0 4 It is important to understand why, without any ex-
planation, the court concluded that Gateway was the offeror.
98. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
99. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1149.
103. Id. at 1148 (citing Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996); Chi.
Pac. Corp. v. Can. Life Assurance Co., 850 F.2d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1988)).
104. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
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F. Identifying the Offeror
In ProCD, the court had focused on the vendor as the offeror,
the master of the offer, who allegedly limited the manner in which
the power of acceptance had to be exercised by the buyer.' The
rolling theory requires the vendor to be the offeror to assure the
enforcement of the vendor's terms. By allowing its product to be
placed on a shelf of a self-service retail store, the ProCD software
was offered for sale. °6 The vendor was the offeror in that case.
Patrons of such stores are offerees with a power of acceptance.
Where, however, a buyer telephones an order for a computer and
provides a credit card number to the order-taker, the buyer is the
offeror creating a power of acceptance in the vendor.
As several courts have noted,0 7 there is not a scintilla of doubt
that the Hills were the offerors, but it was essential for the court
to characterize Gateway as the offeror to assure the application of
the theory the court created from whole cloth. If Gateway was not
the offeror, the theory crumbles. The court offers no explanation
for characterizing the vendor as the offeror, because there is no
explanation.
G. The Essential Rationale
It is important to recite the court's essential rationale for the
rolling theory in the court's own words:
If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales oper-
ations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement
of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the
droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten poten-
tial buyers. Others would hang up in rage over the waste of
their time. And oral recitation would not avoid customers' as-
sertions (whether true or feigned) that the clerk did not read
term X to them, or that they did not remember or understand
it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial
transactions. Customers as a group are better off when ven-
dors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic reci-
tation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.
105. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
106. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50.
107. See discussion infra Part II.
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Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or un-
read.1°8
The avoidance of "costly and ineffectual steps"1"9 (transaction
costs) is the singular rationale for creating a costly and ineffectual
new theory that postpones contract formation. In the context of
these facts, however, there is another way to avoid such transac-
tion costs that will also avoid the exacerbated transaction costs of
the new theory.
Suppose the Gateway order-taker had said, 'When you receive
your computer, it is very important to read Gateway's standard
contract terms you will find inside the container. If you do not
agree with the contract terms, you may object within thirty days
and return everything in the box for a full refund." Such a ven-
dor's statement can be made in no more than fifteen seconds. It
has become common for a buyer to be informed that the call may
be recorded and monitored for extra-contractual reasons. Such a
statement would be part of the record."'
The fifteen second statement above avoids the transaction cost
evils to which the court refers while assuring adequate notice of
contract terms that will be delivered with the product. It avoids
mischaracterizing the offeree as the offeror. If the Hills were cor-
rectly viewed as offerors creating a power of acceptance in Gate-
way, and the order-taker simply took the Hills' credit card number
and either expressly or impliedly manifested acceptance of the
Hills' offer, Gateway should have been seen as having accepted
the offer, forming a contract without Gateway's terms. Even if the
response to the Hills' offer left doubt as to whether the order-taker
accepted or had the authority to accept the offer, acceptance of the
108. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
109. Id.
110. A recent case from the Seventh Circuit, itself, provides an analogous application.
In Spivey v. Adaptive Mktg. LLC, Spivey called a phone number to order a product. 622
F.3d 816, 817 (7th Cir. 2010). The telemarketer made an offer for a membership in a club
whose members were entitled to discounts from various vendors. Id. The membership was
free for thirty days. Id. If Spivey did not object within thirty days, he would then be billed
at $8 per month for continuation of the membership. Id. at 817-18. Spivey replied "[olkay"
to this offer. Id. at 818. When he did not cancel the membership within thirty days, the
monthly billing began. Spivey, 622 F.3d at 818. A record of the conversation identified the
buyer's voice. Id. at 817-20. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the
vendor in holding that Spivey agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement unless he
objected within thirty days. See id. at 822. Spivey's agreement created a duty to speak,
which is different from imposing a duty to object to terms inside a box with no prior oppor-
tunity to be aware of such a duty.
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Hills' offer would unequivocally occur no later than the time the
computer was shipped.11'
If, however, the Hills were properly characterized as offerors
and the order-taker had read the fifteen second statement above,
notifying them that the computer was being sold under Gateway's
terms, such a response would be a clear counter offer. The Hills'
completion of the telephone transaction after hearing that notice
would bind the Hills to a contract under which their duty would be
subject to a condition precedent of their satisfaction with the
terms to be delivered with the computer. Such a process would
not only avoid the transaction costs of droning through pages of
boilerplate; it would also avoid the much more expensive transac-
tion costs of litigation that continues under the rolling theory be-
cause the defects in the theory have produced pervasive confusion
and a consequent split of authority.
An analogous situation occurs involving "clickwrap""' versus
"browsewrap""' licenses in the installation of computer programs.
Where license terms appear on the computer screen and require
the installer to click an "I agree" button to activate the installation
of a program, the user is bound by the license terms, regardless of
whether he bothers to read them."' If, however, the only reference
is to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen that
may be observed only by scrolling to it, "it is not sufficient to place
consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms."'
1
H. Absence of Notice-Consumers v. Merchants
The Hills argued that the ProCD holding was based on the no-
tice on the outside of the package--"notice on the outside; terms
on the inside"-which could incorporate later terms."6 There was
no notice of any kind on the outside of the delivered Gateway
box."7 The court, however, dismissed this distinction on the foot-
ing that notice on the outside of the box displayed in a store allows
111. The buyer's offer could be accepted by either a prompt promise to ship or the
prompt shipment of the computer. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2003).
112. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21-22, 22 n.4 (2d Cir.
2001) (discussing 'clickwrap").
113. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (dis-
cussing "browsewrap").
114. Specht, 306 F.3d at 22 n.4, 31.
115. Id. at 32 (opinion written by then Judge Sotomayor, who distinguished the ProCD
and Hill cases).
116. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997).
117. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
Vol. 50
Rolling Contract Theory
a buyer to decide whether to assume the risk of terms inside.
118
The delivered Gateway box, however, was just a "shipping carton"
and the notice on the box, "fragile," is "functional" to alert ship-
ping handlers rather than would-be purchasers.'19 It is difficult to
characterize the court's response beyond the phrase "non-
responsive." Is the court negating any requirement of notice on
any container, either on a store shelf or delivered by a carrier, or
would notice only be required on the package in the store while it
would not be required on the delivered package? If notice on a
container is required in any situation, is an inconspicuous notice
like the notice on the ProCD package sufficient?
The court insisted that "the Hills knew before they ordered the
computer that the carton would contain some important terms,
and they did not seek to discover these in advance."2 ° It is impor-
tant to consider how the court determined that the Hills should
have known about some terms: "Gateway ads state that they come
with limited warranties and support." 2'
Assuming the Hills had seen and read such ads, beyond the fact
that the "terms" are so vague as to be unenforceable, advertise-
ments are generally not operative as offers. At least, they were
not operative as offers prior to this case. Moreover, does a state-
ment about "limited warranties" or "lifetime support" provide any
notice of arbitration? If the Hills wanted to know what was meant
by "limited warranty and lifetime support," how would they learn
the Gateway meaning? The court suggests that the ad should in-
duce buyers such as the Hills to ask the vendor what its ad meant,
or they could pursue public sources such as computer magazines
and web sites of vendors that may contain such information. At
this point, one gets the distinct impression that the court is not
concerned about mounting transaction costs for the buyer in a rel-
atively simple transaction.
The Hills also argued that the ProCD analysis should not apply
to their transaction since Matthew Zeidenberg and ProCD were
"merchants," while the Hills were certainly not merchants, and
non-merchants are treated differently under section 2-207.22 The
court was annoyed by this argument, which it characterized as





122. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
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207 is irrelevant. 123 Clarifying any confusion on this point in its
ProCD opinion, the court emphasized that the rolling contract
analysis applies to "merchants and consumers alike."124 It also
stated that Matthew Zeidenberg was not a merchant since he
bought the ProCD software at a retail store, "an uncommon place
to acquire inventory." 5 Nothing in the U.C.C. section defining
"merchant," however, suggests this test.'26 It is certainly possible
for a merchant to purchase something for its business in a retail
store.
I. Pursuit of the Express Warranty-The "Irrelevancy" of Section
2-209
The court suggests the possibility of a cogent argument for en-
forcing Gateway's terms when it notes that "Itlhe Hills have in-
voked Gateway's warranty and are not satisfied with its response,
so they are not well positioned to say that Gateway's obligations
were fulfilled when the motor carrier unloaded the box."127 The
first part of this sentence could support an argument that invok-
ing Gateway's express warranty that was part of the terms inside
the box evidences the Hills' agreement to a modification under
section 2-209 that binds the Hills to Gateway's terms, including
the arbitration agreement. The court, however, avoided this pos-
sibility. Subjecting the additional terms inside the box to a section
2-209 modification would undermine the rolling theory since it
necessarily would require a finding that the Hills and Gateway
had made a prior contract that could be later modified. To assure
the application of the rolling theory, section 2-209 must be deemed
as "irrelevant" as section 2-207.
Confusion abounds in the court's analysis. There is no basis for
the court's reference to contract formation occurring when the car-
rier "unloaded the box." The contract was either formed during
the telephone discussion between the Hills and the order-taker or
no later than Gateway's shipment of the computer accompanied by





127. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
128. U.C.C. section 2-206(1)(b) recognizes shipment as a reasonable manner of accep-
tance, unless the buyer unambiguously requires a promissory acceptance.
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206, however, it fails to consider the statutory requirement that
such "shipment" constituted acceptance.
J. Silence as Acceptance
The rolling theory imposes a duty on the buyer to speak within
the time stated by the vendor or be bound by the vendor's terms
inside the box. Such a view is diametrically opposed to the gener-
ally accepted view that the receipt of an offer does not impose a
duty to speak on the offeree." 9 Indeed, the general rule is that
silence does not constitute acceptance except in three situations,
none of which easily fit the rolling contract scenario.3
The first exception involves a party accepting the benefits of of-
fered services with an opportunity to reject them, knowing that
the supplier expects to be paid. 1' This exception, however, is de-
signed to deal with services already performed and knowingly ac-
cepted without any prior contract. Upon delivery of goods pur-
suant to a buyer's offer, a reasonable buyer would assume a con-
tract had already been formed. The second exception is particu-
larly important under the rolling theory. Where an offeror states
that acceptance may be manifested by action or inaction, the offe-
ree is said to have accepted such an offer only if the offeree in-
tends to accept by remaining silent and inactive.'32 An offeree's
silence in response to such an offer is equivocal and will only be
viewed as an acceptance when confirmed by the offeree.'13 Under
the rolling theory, however, such silence and inaction would con-
stitute acceptance in the face of the offeree's subsequent denial of
an intention to accept by silence. The third exception allows si-
lence to operate as an acceptance resulting from a course of deal-
ing between the parties and would have no application to buyers
such as the Hills who have no course of dealing with the vendor.
3
1
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981).
130. Id. § 69(1).
131. Id. § 69(1)(a).
132. Id. § 69(1)(b).
133. Id. § 69 cmt. (c).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c). For a further exploration of
silence as an acceptance of "terms later," see James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE
L. REV. 1693, 1706-10 (2000).
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K Failing to Recognize the "Sale on Approval"-Risk of Loss
The rolling contract theory is based on the buyer's right to reject
the seller's terms, thereby precluding the formation of a contract.
In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit stated that the theory allows the
buyer to reject if he finds the license terms "unsatisfactory."13 5 The
buyer need not justify his decision if he chooses to reject the
terms. The court's requirement of a buyer's subjective approval
immediately suggests another U.C.C. category that is completely
ignored by the Seventh Circuit: the potential contract emanating
from a "sale on approval."36
U.C.C. section 2-326 recognizes a "sale on approval" as a "sale
on satisfaction," where "[tihe goods are delivered to the proposed
purchaser but they remain the property of the seller until the
buyer accepts them."'37 Risk of loss rests on the seller until the
buyer accepts the goods. Quaere: would this risk allocation ap-
ply under the rolling theory? The difference between a traditional
sale on approval and the "rolling contract" is the buyer's aware-
ness that his approval is essential to form the contract; the rolling
contract buyer, however, is totally unaware that his agreement is
subject to his unfettered decision to accept or reject the seller's
terms, until he discovers such terms inside the box containing the
goods or fails to discover them within the time prescribed in the
terms. If the buyer was not bound by any duty, his promise is il-
lusory and the vendor's promise is unenforceable. If, however, the
buyer has an initial duty to take receipt of the goods with the en-
closed terms and either reject the terms within the prescribed
time or accept the terms expressly or by silence, a contract requir-
ing the performance of one of these alternatives was necessarily
formed before the buyer was aware of the terms inside the box.
The Gateway terms and conditions inside the box are described
as allowing the customer to "return the computer to Gateway, for
any reason, for a full refund (less shipping charges) within thirty
days of receipt."'39 Under the agreement, "retention of the com-
puter beyond the thirty-day period of free trial equates to an ac-
ceptance of Gateway's proposed terms and conditions."' 40 Thus,
135. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
136. See U.C.C. § 2-326 (2003).
137. Id. § 2-326 cmt. 1.
138. Id. § 2-326 cmt. 3.
139. Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *2 (Del. Ch.
March 16, 2000), affd, 763 A.2d 92 (Del. 2000).
140. Westendorf, 2000 WL 307369, at *2.
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the customer is not limited to objecting to Gateway's terms to re-
turn the computer, but the terms suggest that the customer has
agreed to pay for the computer and accept Gateway's terms, or
return it within thirty days and pay shipping charges. Such a
contractual duty to perform one of the alternatives could only re-
sult from a contract formed prior to the delivery of the computer.
The court denies that any formation occurred at an earlier time.1
Recognizing an earlier formation time would invoke the precedent
discussed above: either the additional terms inside the box would
be totally inoperative or they would be subject to the material al-
teration test under section 2-207(2).
L. An Antidote-The Counter Offer Theorem
Another unresolved issue is illustrated by a simple example. In
a jurisdiction that has embraced the rolling contract theory, a
merchant places a telephone order for goods (the Hill opinion em-
phasizes that the rolling theory applies to merchants and non-
merchants alike).4 2 The goods are shipped with rolling contract
terms inside: disclaimers of implied warranties, an exclusive re-
pair and replacement remedy, an arbitration clause, and a choice
of law and choice of forum clause. The terms expressly allow re-
jection and refund of any purchase price paid if an objection to the
terms occurs within thirty days. The rolling theory would treat
the vendor as the offeror. In the absence of two "battling" forms,
section 2-207 would not apply under the rolling theory. Within
thirty days, the buyer notifies the vendor that the buyer is quite
willing to pay the agreed price for the goods, which it will retain,
while expressly rejecting any of the seller's additional terms inside
the box. The buyer's notice ends with the statement, "[ilf you ob-
ject to these terms within the next thirty days, please refund the
price paid and we will promptly return the goods. Absent such an
express notification, your silence will indicate your acceptance."
Since the rolling theory insists that no contract is formed on the
vendor's terms until the buyer does not object to the enclosed
terms within the prescribed period, the buyer must be able to
make such a counter offer. Indeed, the buyer's counter offer indi-
cating silence as acceptance does not suffer like the original offer'
13
since the vendor initially proposed the manner of a silent accep-
141. Id. at *5.
142. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
143. See supra Part I.J.
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tance.'4 If, however, prior to delivery the buyer was bound to ei-
ther accept the goods with the vendor's terms or object to the
terms and return the goods, a counter offer would not be possible,
but neither would the rolling contract theory's insistence on a lat-
er contract formation.
Though Judge Easterbrook's opinions for the Seventh Circuit of-
ten inspire well-deserved accolades, as the foregoing analysis sug-
gests, ProCD and Hill confirm an earlier assessment of "a swash-
buckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation
and precedent.", 45 In an effort to solve the perennial problem of
the effect to be accorded unread post-purchase boilerplate terms,
the Seventh Circuit establishes a clearly excessive analytical
price.
III. THE CASE LAW UNDER THE ROLLING CONTRACT THEORY
A. The Unexplained Conclusion in New York
One of the earliest adoptions of the rolling theory occurred in
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., a class action alleging various
breaches. 146 Gateway moved to dismiss the action on the basis of
an arbitration clause that appeared as part of its standard terms
and conditions delivered inside the box with the computers."'47 The
trial judge rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the arbitration clause
was a material alteration of their pre-existing agreement under
section 2-207.48
144. In a much simpler setting, a pest control service sent an offer containing a boiler-
plate arbitration provision to homeowners to renew the service. Cook's Pest Control v.
Rebar, 852 So. 2d 730, 733 (Ala. 2002). The homeowners replied with a letter accompany-
ing their payment that rejected the vendor's arbitration provision. Cook's Pest Control, 852
So. 2d at 733. The court held that the vendor's acceptance of the payment accepted the
homeowner's counteroffer to eliminate the arbitration clause. Id. at 738.
145. John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 869, 905 (2002).
146. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
147. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571. Arbitration provisions are intended to protect the
corporation rather than dictate the forum, as one commentator recently explained:
An arbitration clause is included in the contract to insulate the corporation from the
punishing effects of class actions and not as a serious choice of alternative forum. As
Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit colorfully noted,
"[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."
Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Re-
sponse, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 361-62 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
148. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571. The court, however, concluded that the arbitration
clause was substantively unconscionable under U.C.C. section 2-302. Id. at 575.
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The appellate division cited the ProCD and Hill opinions in
holding that the "contract was not formed with the [plaintiffs]
placement of the telephone order or the delivery of the goods." 49
"Instead, an enforceable contract was formed only with the con-
sumer's decision to retain the merchandise beyond the thirty day
period specified in the agreement.""' Section 2-207 was said not to
apply."' The court provides no explanation for this holding, but
distinguishes the case from an earlier case "where the parties did
in fact have a pre-existing oral agreement.""' The earlier case
held that where an oral agreement is accompanied by the vendor's
draft sales contract that included an arbitration clause, the buyer
is not bound by such a term."' This holding cannot be distin-
guished from the rolling theory. Moreover, the Brower opinion is
totally devoid of any explanation for its conclusion that no pre-
existing oral agreement existed in the case before the court. Why
no contract existed between the computer buyers and Gateway
when the computers were ordered or, at the latest, when they
were shipped, is not discussed. The court simply accepts the roll-
ing theory as fiat. While the Brower case is always cited as the
New York authority adopting the rolling theory, it is hardly com-
pelling authority."'
B. Confusion Abounds in Washington
M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp. is inva-
riably cited as support for the "majority" view due to the Supreme
Court of Washington's adoption of the rolling theory over a spi-
rited dissent joined by another member of that court."' A con-
struction contractor ordered software used for bidding analysis on
construction projects. A representative of the software developer
signed the contractor's purchase order containing the contractor's
149. Id. at 571-72.
150. Id. at 572.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 572 (citing S & T Sportswear Corp. v. Drake Fabrics, Inc., 593 N.Y.S.2d 799
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993)).
153. S & T Sportswear Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 799. The opinion merely states that there
was an oral agreement that did not include an arbitration provision, and the buyer did not
sign the vendor's draft sales contract. Id.
154. See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001) (reacting
critically to the rolling theory that "distinguishes" Brower).
155. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
156. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 307.
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desired terms. '57 The delivered software discs were covered by a
"shrinkwrap" license that included a limitation of remedies clause
excluding consequential damages.'5 8 Defects in the software re-
sulted in a $1.95 million error in a construction bid. 59 The trial
and intermediate appellate courts held that the limitation of lia-
bility clause was enforceable. 6 °
On appeal, the buyer argued that the signed purchase order
formed the contract and did not include the limitation clause.'
6'
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the purchase order
terms were incomplete and the parties did not intend that writing
to constitute their integrated contract. 62 The buyer then claimed
that the vendor's license terms were material alterations of the
parties' agreement that did not become part of their contract un-
der section 2-207. '68 The plaintiff relied on the Step-Saver analy-
sis,1 which the court distinguished.' Finding no Washington
case law dealing with the formation question in this case, the
court found the reasoning in ProCD, Hill, and Brower to be persu-
asive pursuant to the general language in U.C.C. section 2-204
(recognizing a contract formed in any manner),166 upon which
ProCD so heavily relied without mentioning section 2-206 or other
relevant concerns.
The majority opinion, however, was based on its unique analysis
of section 2-207, which begins with a curious definition of "mer-
chant" in U.C.C. Article 2.16' The court held that the contract was
not between "merchants," because the buyer, a building contrac-
tor, did not deal in software, and the U.C.C. definition of "mer-
chant" requires a party who deals in goods of that kind.'66 This
statement, however, confuses the meaning of U.C.C. section 2-104,
which recognizes a narrow definition of "merchant" when applied
157. Id. at 308.
158. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 308-09.
159. Id. at 309.
160. Id. at 310.
161. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 310.
162. Id. at 311.
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 30-40.
165. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 311-13. The Mortenson court noted that the buyer in Step-
Saver was not an end-user of the product, but a value-added retailer who claimed the li-
cense did not apply to it at all. Id. at 312 (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v Wyse Tech.,
939 F.2d 91, 201 (3d Cir. 1991)). Moreover, the Step-Saver buyer twice refused to sign the
disputed license agreement. Id.
166. Id. at 313.




to a seller of goods who must regularly sell goods of the kind in-
volved in the transaction in order to be charged with making an
implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. section 2-
314(1).169 Section 2-104, however, also recognizes a broad defini-
tion of "merchant" that applies to virtually anyone in business for
purposes of section 2-207.170 The buyer (Mortenson) should, there-
fore, have been recognized as a "merchant" (a party in business),
purchasing a product for use in that business.
Having concluded that Mortenson was not a merchant, the court
compounds the error in its startling view that section 2-207 "does
not specify when additional terms become part of a contract in-
volving a non-merchant." 7' As noted earlier, the first sentence of
section 2-207(2) deals with additional terms in a contract involv-
ing at least one non-merchant. 172 Additional terms are mere pro-
posals to which the other party would have to expressly assent if
the terms were to become part of the contract. 73 If the majority
had been correct in characterizing Mortenson as a non-merchant,
the vendor's additional terms would have been mere proposals to
which Mortenson never agreed. The court's misconstruction, how-
ever, precluded any possibility of a section 2-207 application to
these facts.
174
In light of this precedent, it is anything but remarkable that
subsequent opinions in the State of Washington have manifested
considerable confusion in relation to the rolling theory. In Tacoma
Fixture Co. v. Rudd Co.,173 Tacoma purchased paint products from
169. U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2003). Comment 2 states that "in Section 2-314 on the war-
ranty of merchantability, such warranty is implied only 'if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.'" Id.
170. Id. Comment 2 to section 2-104 states that for purposes of section 2-207, as well as
other specific sections, "almost every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be a
,merchant'...." Id. See Precision Printing Co. v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 993 F. Supp.
338, 355 n.14 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
171. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 312 n.9.
172. U.C.C. section 2-207(2) states that "[tihe additional terms are to be construed as
proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless: .... " Id.
173. U.C.C. § 2-207(2). The State of Washington's version of section 2-207 does not
differ from the original version. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 62A.2-207 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 legislation)..
174. The dissent treated the additional terms as a proposal to modify an existing con-
tract under U.C.C. section 2-209, a section ignored by the majority and other courts using
the rolling theory. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 320 (Sanders, J., dissenting). The use of that
section would require an acceptance of the proposed modification, which would not occur
through mere silence. Id.
175. 174 P.3d 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
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Rudd for several years by placing the orders by phone.' Rudd
would ship the paint, followed by an invoice including a disclaimer
of implied warranties and a term waiving any claim against Rudd
if notification of the claim did not occur within ten days of deli-
very.177 When Tacoma made a claim for breach of warranty, Rudd
defended on the basis of its invoice terms. The court distin-
guished the Mortenson analysis since the parties in the instant
case were both merchants (as if they were not in Mortenson).'79 It
found that the parties had already made a contract when Rudd
sent its invoices after shipping the goods.8 ° It viewed Rudd's addi-
tional terms as "proposals for addition to the contract" under sec-
tion 2-207.'18 This is consistent with comment 2 to section 2-207,
which treats an additional term after a contract is formed "as a
proposal for an added term ....
Instead of simply concluding that the proposals were not ac-
cepted, the court characterized Rudd's additional terms as materi-
al alterations of the contract.'8 3 It would also have been sufficient
to conclude that the additional terms were not part of the contract.
The court, however, proceeded to demonstrate considerable diffi-
culty with section 2-207, which it characterized as the "'defiant,
lurking demon patiently waiting to condemn its interpreters to the
depths of despair.m
184
Compounding its misanalysis, it held that, while the parties
never agreed to Rudd's additional terms, they conducted them-
selves in a manner indicating their intention to form a contract,
thus requiring the application of section 2-207(3).18 That section,
however, applies only where the parties have failed to make a con-
tract in any fashion but proceed to conduct themselves as if they
had made a contract.'86 Here, the court recognized that the parties
had clearly made a contract, and the only issue was whether
Rudd's terms that were supplied after the contract was made
176. Tacoma, 174 P.3d at 722.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 724.
180. Id.
181. Tacoma, 174 P.3d at 724.
182. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (2003).
183. Tacoma, 174 P.3d at 724.
184. Id. at 723 (quoting Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp.
1097, 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1984), amended by, 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
185. Id. at 724.
186. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7.
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should become part of the contract." Section 2-207(3) was not
designed to deal with this situation. Nonetheless, because Rudd's
additional terms did not match previous terms, the court con-
cluded that they were not operative under section 2-207(3))-
certainly a novel analysis but one that ended this tortuous jour-
ney.'88 In passing, however, the court also noted an earlier Wash-
ington case where an invoice containing a warranty disclaimer
was included in the package of the delivered goods, and the court
rejected the disclaimer. 8 ' Though Washington is listed as one of
the jurisdictions adopting the rolling theory, it is euphemistic to
suggest that confusion abounds in this jurisdiction concerning the
possible application of the theory.
C. Kansas Concludes Otherwise
In Wachter Management Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., ' after
detailed negotiations, Dexter & Chaney, Inc. ("DCI") issued a writ-
ten offer to supply software to Wachter that contained clear terms
and was accompanied by a cover letter stating that the DCI pro-
posal "includes modules and licenses." 9' Wachter's agent signed
the proposal.1"2  The software arrived, accompanied by a
"shrinkwrap" agreement that included "a choice of law/venue pro-
vision providing that the agreement would be governed by the law
of the State of Washington and any disputes would be resolved by
state courts in King County, Washington."'93 Such a forum-
shopping provision appearing in a software supplier's form is not
surprising in light of the decision issued three years earlier by the
Washington Supreme Court in the Mortenson case, which was
seen as upholding shrinkwrap licenses.
Problems with the software induced Wachter to file suit in Kan-
sas, and DCI moved to dismiss on the basis of the choice of
law/venue provision.194 Wachter countered that these additional
187. Tacoma, 174 P.3d at 724.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 725 (citing Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 625 P.2d 171,
541-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)).
190. 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006).
191. Wachter, 144 P.3d at 751.
192. Id. at 749.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 749-50.
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terms were unenforceable. 9' The district court denied DCI's mo-
tion.
16
On appeal, a majority of the Kansas Supreme Court found that
the contract was formed when Wachter's agent signed the DCI
offer.197 After distinguishing ProCD and Hill, the court found Mor-
tenson factually similar.' 9 It disagreed with the majority analysis
in Mortenson, based on ProCD and Hill, and adhered to the "tradi-
tional contract principles" of the dissenting judges in Mortenson.'99
The court held that DCI and Wachter had negotiated the terms,
and the DCI offer to sell had been accepted by Wachter." The
court further held that the license terms accompanying the soft-
ware were proposals to modify the contract under U.C.C. section
2-209, which were not accepted by Wachter. °'
A dissent joined by two other justices focused on the cover letter
sent with the DCI offer stating that "[t]he proposal includes mod-
,,202
ules and licenses. It concluded that, by signing the proposal,
Wachter accepted the licenses.23 The dissent does not explain how
the terms "modules" or "licenses" include a choice of law/venue
provision for the entire contract. Moreover, unlike the consumer
telephone transaction, where it would be unreasonable for the or-
der-taker to read boilerplate terms, this contract involved mer-
chants who had negotiated this transaction in detail before the
written proposal was submitted.2 4 It would not be unreasonable
to include the license terms at that time, particularly if provisions
such as the choice of law/venue clause were important to the offe-
ror.
205
Alternatively, the dissent suggests that the reference to "li-
censes" in the proposal manifested the offeror's intention that a
layered contract would exist, that would not be formed until
Wachter agreed to the license terms (whatever they may have
been).26 Assuming a contract would not be formed until that time,
195. Id. at 750.
196. Wachter, 144 P.3d at 750.
197. Id. at 751.
198. Id. at 754-55.
199. Id. at 755 (citing M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305,
316 (Wash. 2000) (Sanders, J., dissenting)).
200. Id.
201. Wachter, 144 P.3d at 755.
202. Id. at 755-56 (Luckert, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 756.
204. Id. at 749 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 756. (Luckert, J., dissenting).
206. Wachter, 144 P.3d at 756 (Luckert, J., dissenting).
Vol. 50
Rolling Contract Theory
however, is counterintuitive. Essentially, the dissent simply ad-
mits it was persuaded by the result in ProCD and Hilly which it
would apply regardless of severe analytical hurdles.
D. Following the "Eminent" Seventh Circuit
Writing for the Rhode Island Supreme Court in DeFontes v.
Dell, Inc., Chief Justice Williams recognized that "[t]he eminent
Judge Frank Easterbrook has authored what are widely consi-
dered to be the two leading cases on so-called 'shrinkwrap' agree-
ments."2 8 Applying Texas law, the court recognized that if the
contract was formed "at the moment Dell's sales agents processed
the customer's credit card payment and agreed to ship the goods,
as plaintiffs argue," any later additional terms would be viewed as
part of a confirmation under section 2-207, or as offers to modify
under section 2-209.2o9 The court proceeded to herald the Easter-
brook analysis that "challenged the traditional understanding of
offer and acceptance" and "held that U.C.C. § 2-207 was inapplica-
ble in cases involving only one form" which made "the 'battle-of-
the-forms' provision irrelevant."21 ° Accepting this analysis without
question, the opinion quotes the Seventh Circuit's essential ratio-
nale for the rolling contract theory that "practical considerations"
required a new theory, as discussed above. 2 '
While expressly adopting the "layered" theory, the court empha-
sized that "the burden falls squarely on the seller to show that the
buyer has accepted the seller's terms after delivery."21 ' The plain-
tiffs had three opportunities to review the seller's terms. 12 A
hyperlink on the seller's website was deemed insufficient since it
was inconspicuously located at the bottom of the webpage.214 The
seller's terms, however, also appeared in an acknowledgment sent
to buyers when they placed their orders, though the evidence was
not clear as to whether these acknowledgments were received be-
fore the goods were delivered. 2"' The same terms and conditions
207. Id. at 757.
208. 984 A.2d 1061, 1068 (R.I. 2009) (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996)).
209. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1067-68.
210. Id. at 1068 (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452).
211. Id. at 1069 (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452).
212. Id. at 1071.
213. Id. at 1063.
214. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1063.
215. Id. at 1063-64, 1064 n.4.
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were also included inside the box with the goods.216 While the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island viewed these notices as clearly suffi-
cient to apprise the buyers that they would be bound to these
terms, it did not advise them of the period beyond which they
would be bound by their silence.2 7 Because the terms did not
make it reasonably apparent that the buyers could reject the
terms simply by returning the goods, the court affirmed the deci-
sion below that held that an arbitration agreement in the seller's
terms was not enforceable.218
E. The Theory Rejected
In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., William Klocek brought individual
and class action claims against Gateway, which demanded arbi-
tration under its standard terms and conditions delivered inside
the box with the computer.2"9 The terms stated that the buyer ac-
cepted them by retaining the computer beyond five days after de-
livery.22°
Noting that the law of Kansas or Missouri probably applied but
that neither had resolved the issue of whether terms received with
goods become part of the parties' agreement, the court found a
split of authority in other jurisdictions.22' In addition to the Step-
Saver case discussed above,222 the court noted Arizona Retail Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,223 which held that license terms
shipped with software were not part of the agreement.
224 It com-
pared these cases with ProCD and Hill, as well as Mortenson from
Washington State.22'
Gateway urged the court to follow Hill, but the court found con-
siderable criticism of Hill among "legal commentators."226 While
other courts followed the Seventh Circuit,227 the instant court was
216. Id. at 1064.
217. Id. at 1071.
218. Id. at 1073.
219. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Kan. 2000).
220. Koceck, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35.
221. Id. at 1337-38.
222. See discussion supra Part I.B.
223. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
224. Koceck, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1338, 1339 n.9.
227. Id. at 1339 n.9 (citing Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL
307369 (Del. Ch. March 16, 2000), affd, 763 A.2d 92 (Del. 2000): Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp.,
No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL
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not persuaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would do the
same.28 It viewed the holding in ProCD and Hill, that section 2-
207 was irrelevant because the transactions involved only one
form, as not supported by any authority in those cases and con-
trary to the statute as enacted in Kansas or Missouri. 229 The court
also noted that the Seventh Circuit failed to explain in Hill how
the vendor became the offeror, stating that "[i]n typical consumer
transactions, the purchaser is the offeror and the vendor is the
offeree."23° Gateway produced no evidence to change that charac-
terization in the instant case.23' The buyer was the offeror, and
Gateway accepted the offer by agreeing to ship the goods or, at the
latest, when it shipped the computer.2 2 Since the plaintiff was not
a merchant, under section 2-207, any additional term would be a
mere proposal that could be binding only if the plaintiff assented
to it.2"' The court thus denied Gateway's motion to dismiss.2 4
F. Oklahoma Is Not Persuaded
In Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp.,2 5 the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa confronted an insufficient record.26 For purposes of discus-
sion, however, the court assumed that the Dell "Terms and Condi-
tions of Sale," which included an arbitration clause, were received
by the plaintiffs with the shipment of the computer, with the in-
voice, or both.2 7 After reviewing the progeny of ProCD and Hill,
the court considered when the contracts were formed. It looked
to U.C.C. section 2-206(1), which, the court stated, generally an-
swers that question.239 Under that section, where a buyer places
an order, the buyer is the offeror and the contract is formed when
the vendor-offeree agrees to deliver the goods. If, at the time the
order was placed, the language and circumstances indicated that
823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1997); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000)).
228. Id. at 1339.
229. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
230. Id. at 1340.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1340, 1340 n.ll (citing U.C.C. § 2-206(b) (2003)).
233. Id. at 1341 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-207 cmt. 2 (1966)).
234. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
235. 138 P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005).
236. Rogers, 138 P.3d at 834.
237. Id. at 829.
238. Id. at 831-32.




the contract would not be formed until the buyer received the
terms and conditions and decided whether to object to them, the
arbitration provision would be a term of the contract. 241 If, howev-
er, the contract was formed at the time the orders were placed, the
arbitration provision would not be a term of the contract.242
In considering what the terms of the contract between the par-
ties would be,241 the court turned to section 2-207, noting that the
arbitration provision would be a mere proposal to a non-merchant
under section 2-207(2), and that it would not be part of the con-
tract absent the buyer's assent.244 Because the facts in the record
were not sufficient to permit the application of the proper analy-
sis, the court remanded the case.24 ' The court's analysis, however,
clearly rejected the rolling theory.
2 46
G. The Curious Situation in Illinois
It would not be surprising to find an intermediate appellate
court in Illinois influenced by the Seventh Circuit theory an-
nounced in Hill. In Bess v. DirectTV, Inc.,247 the defendant acti-
vated television satellite service at the request of the plaintiff in
1999.248 DirectTV then sent her a customer service agreement
stating that, if she did not accept the terms of the agreement, she
should notify the defendant immediately and service would be dis-
continued.249 The agreement contained an arbitration provision.250
The plaintiff did not cancel the service,251' and the 1999 agreement
was replaced by a subsequent agreement that also contained the
arbitration clause.252 When the plaintiff brought an action over
the payment of fees, the defendant moved to compel arbitration.5
The trial court held the arbitration provision procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.2 On appeal, a majority of the in-
241. Rogers, 138 P.3d at 832.
242. Id. at 833.
243. Id. at 832-33.
244. See id. at 833.
245. Id. at 833-34.
246. Rogers, 138 P.3d at 834. The court applied U.C.C. section 2-207, which would be
inapplicable under the rolling theory.
247. 885 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
248. Bess, 885 N.E.2d at 491.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 491-92.
252. Id. at 492.




stant court found no procedural or substantive unconscionabili-
ty.255
In arguing that the arbitration provision was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable, the plaintiff relied on a decision by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, Razor v. Hyundai Motor America,26
where the plaintiff claimed consequential damages in an action
against the seller of an automobile.2"7 Addressing the issue of
whether the defendant's exclusion of consequential damages was
unconscionable, the Razor court focused on one fact in the case
that "tip[ped] the balance" in the plaintiffs favor.25  The plaintiff
testified that she never saw the vendor's printed warranty con-
taining the exclusion of consequential damages that was in the
glove box of the new car until she accepted the car.2"9 Because the
plaintiffs testimony in this regard was uncontradicted "on this
record," the court concluded that a limitation of liability clause
discovered after the contract is made is ineffective,6 and to en-
force such a clause would be unconscionable.26 '
The majority of the Bess court, however, found the Razor case
"factually distinguishable" since it dealt with a preprinted war-
ranty that was required to be conveyed at the time of sale under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Act").262 The dissenting opi-
nion, on the other hand, noted that the Razor opinion explained
that the Act and the Federal Trade Commission regulations of the
Act were only raised at rehearing and simply "validated" the
court's earlier analysis that treated limitations of liability arriving
after the contract was formed as inoperative.263 Moreover, by the
time Bess received the customer agreement containing the arbi-
tration provision, the equipment had already been installed and
255. Id. at 495-501.
256. 854 N.E.2d 607 (I1. 2006).
257. Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 612-13.
258. Id. at 623.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Frank's Maint. & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 411
n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
261. Id.
262. Bess, 885 N.E.2d at 496-97, 497 n.1 (citing Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 624). The court
noted that the Razor opinion quoted the Federal Trade Commission regulations dealing
with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Id. (citing Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 624 (quoting 16
C.F.R. § 700.11(b) (2000))).




the services were being provided.264 In dissent, Justice Stewart
explained the customer's predicament as follows:
In order to cancel service at that point, after she had taken all
necessary steps to be a DirectTV subscriber, she would have
had to suffer the time, effort, and expense associated with
switching to another service provider. Therefore, Bess was
deprived of "a meaningful choice" in determining whether to
accept the arbitration provision of the Customer Agreement.26
In Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., a subsequent federal district
court case, the court was confronted with the necessity of choosing
between Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., upon which Bess had relied,
and the holding and rationale in Razor.266 In Trijillo, the purchas-
er of an iPhone claimed that the maker and service provider had
misled consumers about the true cost of an iPhone, due to the li-
mited life of the battery, which resulted in necessary battery re-
placements.2 7 The defendant moved to compel arbitration, relying
on a term in the customer agreement.268  Since the customer
agreement was allegedly not provided to the plaintiff until after
the purchase of the iPhone, the plaintiff relied on the holding in
Razor in claiming that the arbitration agreement was unconscion-
able. 269 The defendant, however, cited the Hill case as authority
for enforcing terms arriving after the purchase. 20  The instant
court noted that Bess v. DirectTV had also relied upon the Hill
analysis, where the court stated that the plaintiffs could have
asked the vendor to provide a copy of the agreement before receiv-
ing the computer, or they could have consulted other sources that
may have provided information about the terms of the agree-
ment.21' Noting it was bound to follow the Seventh Circuit's de-
termination of Illinois law absent an intervening and contrary de-
cision from the highest court of the state, however, the Truijillo
court concluded that it had to rely on Razor (a contrary decision
264. Id. at 504-05.
265. Id. at 505 (citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 264 (111. 2006)).
266. 578 F. Supp. 2d 979, 992-95 (N.D. 111. 2008).
267. Trujillo, 578 F. Supp. at 980-81.
268. Id. at 981.
269. Id. at 992.
270. Id. at 993.




from the highest court of the state) to the extent that it was con-
trary to Hill.272 The Trujillo court explained that:
[T]he dispositive factor in that case [Razor] was the unavaila-
bility of the agreement [containing the exclusion of conse-
quential damages] to the consumer until after she had pur-
chased the product. Although it was presumably just as true
in Razor as in Hill that the consumer could have asked in ad-
vance for a copy of the applicable agreement, or could have
checked the website, the Illinois Supreme Court did not hint
that this was at all significant as a matter of Illinois uncons-
cionability law.27
Thus, in Illinois, the case law progeny suggests that the status of
the rolling contract theory requires considerable clarification.
There are other cases citing ProCD and Hill that would add
nothing to the discussion.274 The foregoing cases aptly illustrate
the current applications or rejections of the rolling contract theory
and related issues. The cases adopting the theory manifest little
or no analysis, confusion, erroneous analyses of U.C.C. section 2-
207, and failures to consider other relevant sections of U.C.C. Ar-
ticle 2 as well as the relationship between other cases and the
theory.
IV. A DIFFERENT ECONOMIC DIMENSION
The rolling contracts theory is typically defended on the basis
that it avoids the cognitive overload and attendant transaction
costs that would result from attempting to have buyers instantly
read and understand all of the relevant information accompanying
a contract to sell a given product. By providing the buyer with the
ability to read and digest these terms at the buyer's leisure with
the right of objection and the return of the purchase price, the roll-
272. Trujillo, 578 F. Supp. at 994.
273. Id. Summary judgment for the defendant was granted in a subsequent proceeding
where the plaintiff withdrew his original substantive complaint that the defendant hid
facts concerning the battery life of the iPhone. Id. The court noted that his claims were
untenable since a label affixed to the box of the iPhone disclosed the limited recharge cycles
of the battery. Id. at 985. This resolution did not attempt to address the question of the
status of the rolling theory under Hill in light of the holding and rationale in Razor.
274. Cf. John E. Murray, Jr., Accept-or-Return Contracts, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1853
(Lexis 2008) (discussing confusion of the courts in both MDB, LLC v. BellSouth Adver. &
Publ'g Corp., No. 3:07-cv-126, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70277 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2007) and
Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of America, 134 Fed. App'x 828 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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ing theory suggests a consumer protection purpose, though it is
not limited to consumer transactions. After all, providing the cus-
tomer with an unfettered power to accept or reject the vendor's
terms seems eminently fair. The theory assumes that economists
should be pleased since nasty transaction costs of providing the
customer with ex ante terms, without sufficient time to read or
understand, have been avoided. It is, however, important to rec-
ognize the situation-specific monopoly enjoyed by sellers as to
buyers who have already purchased a product.2"5
The power to accept or return the product is the old-fashioned
marketing ploy called the "money back guarantee" that superfi-
cially suggests that nothing could be more fair. Beyond the fact
that the refund comes without interest that could have been
earned, it is often forgotten that the right to return protects only
the restitution interest. The buyer is returning goods for which, at
the very least, the buyer should receive a return of the purchase
price to avoid manifest, unjust enrichment of the vendor. Again,
however, a reasonable buyer might assume a contract existed be-
fore the goods and the terms were delivered. If such a contract
had been recognized, the buyer would not only have a contract
without adhesive terms; for any breach by the vendor, the buyer
would be entitled to the expectation interest (the benefit of the
bargain),which is ignored whenever a vendor "generously" agrees
to return the purchase price.
Having gone to the trouble and costs of agreeing to purchase a
product, receiving the goods, opening the package and reading the
terms, the buyer must notify the seller of its objection to the
275. One commentator explained that:
In the landmark cases of ProCD v Zeidenberg and Hill v Gateway, the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld form terms included inside the packaging of computer software and
hardware respectively on the grounds that the buyers, who could not access the
terms until after purchasing the merchandise, could have returned it to the sellers if
they did not wish to accept the adhesive terms. After the purchase, however, the
buyers had already invested in the particular products, and returning them would
have required expending additional time and effort. Although the sellers were not
monopolists at the time of sale, they enjoyed a situation-specific monopoly vis-a-vis
customers who had already purchased their merchandise. Of course, they could not
have taken advantage of this by charging a higher price, because the price term had
already been agreed upon (and paid). Unable to renegotiate price, the sellers had an
incentive to try to capture benefits of their monopoly position by providing low-
quality terms.
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1265 (2003). This analysis is similar to the concerns raised by the
dissent in Bess v. DirectTV, Inc. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
Vol. 50
Rolling Contract Theory
terms, repackage the goods, and return them. This must be ac-
complished within the period set by the vendor. In exchange, the
buyer receives a return of the purchase price less shipping
charges. If the buyer can purchase a substitute product only at a
higher cost, the rolling theory provides no "cover" or other expec-
tation interest remedy under the U.C.C.2 76  This is further evi-
dence that the price of efficiency under the rolling contract theory
may be excessive.
V. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM
The "terms later" rolling contract theory is a species of the un-
derlying frustration of determining the operative effect to be ac-
corded standard terms and conditions in a vendor's boilerplate.
Vendors load their boilerplate with defenses against default rules.
Absent any mention of warranties, remedies, or dispute resolution
in a contract for the sale of goods, the buyer is supplied with the
U.C.C. automatic assurance that it will receive goods that accord
with any express and all implied warranties.277 Should the vendor
breach the contract, the buyer has an arsenal of remedial weapons
to assure the protection of its expectation interest, as well as a
right to recover any early payment plus incidental and consequen-
tial damages.27 Absent contrary agreement, dispute resolution will
be pursued in a court of law where a consumer or small business
may find more sympathy with a jury.279 It is not remarkable for a
vendor to attempt to escape such an onslaught by the mere re-
payment of the purchase price. There must, however, be some
manifestation of "agreement" to achieve that end.
Where a buyer sends a written offer, such as a purchase order, a
vendor's definite expression of acceptance will form a contract.
The vendor's boilerplate disclaimers of warranties, exclusive re-
pair and replacement remedy that excludes consequential damag-
es, arbitration provision, and other anti-default clauses will not
become part of the contract if they materially alter the terms of
the buyer's offer.28' Indeed, under current constructions, a buyer
276. These remedies are provided in sections 2-712 and 2-713. U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713
(2003).
277. Id. §§ 2-313 to -315.
278. Id. § 2-711. Section 2-711 lists the buyer's remedies, followed by their individual
elaboration in separate, subsequent sections. Id.
279. All of the remedies under Article 2 of the U.C.C. presume a judicial determination.
280. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
281. Id. § 2-207(2)(b).
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could create a purchase order form that assures victory in the
"battle of the forms" regardless of whether the buyer' form is con-
strued as an offer or as an acceptance.282 Even if the exchanged
forms do not create a contract but the parties proceed to perform
as if they had a contract, any non-matching terms in the ex-
changed forms will be excised and the gaps will be filled with de-
fault terms favoring the buyer.288 If, however, the merchant buyer
made the offer by phone or in person and the only form in the
transaction is the vendor's form with additional terms, the rolling
theory would eliminate the application of section 2-207. Absent a
buyer's later objection, the vendor's terms would become part of
the contract without any inquiry into whether the additional
terms materially altered the terms of the original agreement.
Beyond the total misconstruction of statutory language that is
required to achieve this result, the theory clearly undermines the
purpose of section 2-207. Moreover, consumer buyers do not have
a ready supply of purchase order forms. Thus, the rolling contract
would deprive them of section 2-207 protection as a matter of
course, subjecting them to the vendor's terms, regardless of the
materiality of the terms. This artificial distinction alone is more
than a sufficient reason for rejecting the rolling contract theory.
VI. PURSUING A SOLUTION
Should it make any difference whether the vendor's terms are
provided before the contract is formed, arrive with the goods, or
appear in a separate mailing shortly after the goods are delivered?
Is the buyer more likely to read and understand the vendor's
terms depending upon when they become available?
There is severe cognitive limitation and overload regardless of
when the buyer receives the boilerplate terms. Even before Karl
Lewellyn created the radical section 2-207 and its companion, sec-
tion 2-302, that allowed courts to deem terms unconscionable, it
was an open secret that the vendor's boilerplate is non-negotiable,
thereby making it rational to ignore it, even if it could be unders-
tood. Contentment, if not clarity, was found in Llwellyn's invaria-
282. If a purchase order contains express clauses replicating U.C.C. default terms, such
as implied warranties, remedies, and dispute resolution as well as other terms, such as
choice of law and choice of venue terms, under the "knockout" rule, these express terms will
cancel any expressly conflicting terms in a vendor's form, leaving gaps to be filled by the
U.C.C. default rules, which favor the buyer. A recent, comprehensive analysis of section 2-
207 appears in JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 50 (5th ed. 2011).
283. U.C.C.§ 2-207(3).
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bly quoted recognition that genuine assent to boilerplate terms
does not occur. Such terms become part of the contract through a
presumed assent-a "blanket assent"-to "decent" (conscionable)
terms.284 Professor Hillman finds the Llewellyn solution to be just
fine-or at least the best we can do.25
Similar contentment, however, cannot be found under the roll-
ing theory. It should be a truism that pervasive confusion in the
law of contract formation and related issues is an evil to be
avoided, and the current application, rejection, or efforts to distin-
guish the rolling contract theory are a major contributor to perva-
sive confusion, which has proven to be contagious. Consequently,
it matters whether the theory spreads or is contained.
A current legislative solution is impracticable. The debacle re-
sulting from the attempts to revise Article 2 of the U.C.C. in the
1990's, or even to agree on the enactment of modest amendments
in the early 21st century, augur the necessity of sufficient time to
heal those wounds before a new revision is attempted. Indeed, the
pusillanimous treatment of the split of authority over rolling con-
tract theory in the unenacted amendments testified to the need for
additional time.286 The absence of a comprehensive legislative so-
284. Llwellyn stated that:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far
as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to,
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and
but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to
any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
285. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 746-52 (2002).
286. The amended version of Article 2 of the U.C.C., proposed in 2003, has been officially
withdrawn after its failure to be enacted in any jurisdiction. Comment 5 to the amended
version of section 2-207 stated that:
The section omits any specific treatment of terms attached to the goods, or in or on
the container in which the goods are delivered. This article takes no position on
whether a court should follow the reasoning in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (original 2-207 governs) or the contrary reasoning of
Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (original 2-207 inapplicable).
This modest "amended" version was induced by a rejection of a genuine "revision" of Article
2 in 1999 after a decade of work. The new committee was well aware of the irreconcilable
differences concerning the enforcement of shrinkwrap license terms and the rolling theory.
If the drafters of the amended Article 2 had taken either position on the rolling theory,
enactment would have appeared impossible. In the process of creating any uniform law,
"enactability" is a critical factor. The rolling theory had been adopted in the highly contro-
versial Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA"), which was enacted only
in Maryland and Virginia and was often stated as a reason for the failure of any other
states to enact UCITA. For an analysis of UCITA, see Roger C. Bern, "Terms Later" Con-
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lution, however, should not preclude an interim judicial solution to
the current uncertainty and meta-confusion which is destined to
grow unless it is contained.
VII. A WORKABLE SOLUTION-IDENTIFYING "CONTRACT TERMS"
Invisible terms have always been anathema.87 Neither is the
notion of being bound by invisible terms sufficiently accommo-
dated by an obligation to object to them within the time prescribed
by their author after they are revealed for the first time. While
Llewellyn's "blanket assent" to standardized terms is an economic
necessity, it has not totally eliminated the requirement of mutual
assent in the 21st century. Thus, for example, "[t]he case law on
software licensing has not eroded the importance of assent in con-
tract formation. Mutual assent is the bedrock of any agreement to
which the law will give force."288
Notwithstanding a half-century's recognition of the presence of
mass marketing of goods and services necessitating the use of
standardized boilerplate terms that are rarely read or understood,
the case law has yet to discover a generally accepted solution. The
"rolling" theory is controversial and confusing. As seen earlier,
even where a court praises the theory, it insists upon an emphati-
cally clear notice of post-purchase terms and the right of the buyer
to reject them.289 While ProCD should not be expected to cover the
containers of its packages of discs with contract terms, why was
the notice on the outside of the box (stating that terms were inside
the box) inconspicuous? A telephone order-taker for a product
such as a computer typically has a script that may suggest any
number of marketing possibilities beyond the simple taking of the
order for the computer. If Gateway desired an accept-or-return
contract by insisting on its terms inside the box, a statement re-
quiring no more than fifteen seconds could assure a conspicuous
notification of terms placed inside the box. The buyer could fur-
tracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easter-
brook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POLY 641, 773 (2004).
287. "One of the most hateful acts of the ill-famed tyrant, Caligula, was that of having
the laws placed on pillars so high that the people could not read them." Cutler Corp. v.
Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 1953). The fine-print provision that was deliberately placed
on the reverse of a sheet to hide it was a confession of judgment clause, a "drastic" provi-
sion, that the court found to be inoperative. Cutler, 97 A.2d at 236-38.
288. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
af/d, 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written
or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract.").
289. See supra text accompanying notes 209-19.
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ther be reminded of such terms inside the box by a similarly brief
but conspicuous statement on the outside of the delivered box.
There is neither unreasonable surprise nor oppression in binding
a buyer to conscionable terms arriving inside a box, if the buyer
has been sufficiently alerted to expect such terms, the buyer has
ample time to digest them, and they may be rejected within a rea-
sonable time.
If the vendor's terms will only arrive with the goods, it is not
enough and will not assure a buyer a reasonable opportunity to
review them if the seller simply inserts the terms inside the box,
as in Hill v. Gateway. Professor Stephen Friedman recommends
what he calls a "template notice," which would "require sellers to
do more than merely give notice that unspecified additional terms
will be forthcoming."29 ° The template would be a summary of the
vendor's vital terms to be disclosed before or during the buyer's
offer to purchase, with the full text disclosed later.29 ' Even at-
tempting to summarize disclaimers of warranties, remedy limita-
tions, arbitration, and other vendor's terms during a telephone
call, however, would encounter the same obstacles Hill was de-
signed to prevent.
Determinations of whether summaries were adequate are pre-
dictable litigation issues. While litigation issues may still arise,
they are likely to be minimized by requiring a conspicuous notice
of "contract terms." It is feasible for courts to determine whether
a notice of forthcoming "contract terms" is conspicuous on the out-
side of a box or in the language of an order-taker, just as it is feas-
ible for a court to determine whether the "contract terms" inside
the box were conspicuously presented. In a self-service transac-
tion, the box containing the goods should include a conspicuous
notice that the product is being sold on the basis of "contract terms
inside the package."292 Such a notice should state that the buyer
should "read the important contract terms inside this package. If
you are not satisfied with these contract terms, return the product
290. Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2
(2006).
291. Id.
292. In the case upon which the Seventh Circuit relied heavily as support for its new
theory, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the face of the cruise line ticket contained the fol-
lowing alert: "SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES
IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT-ON LAST PAGES 1, 2, 3." 499 U. S. 585,
587. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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for a full refund of the purchase price."29 The terms inside the
package should also be conspicuously labeled "contract terms."
Any reticence to use the word "contract" to identify terms
creates a suspicion of obfuscation. Similarly, the contract terms
inside the package should not be found in a "user's guide" or "in-
struction" booklet. Such a title misleads the user who may avoid
reading any portion of it, or who may read only that portion that
deals with a particular problem of installation or use. Fundamen-
tal contract law continues to preclude operative effect to terms in
documents that a reasonable party would not understand as in-
cluding contract terms.294 There is no justification for enclosing
contract terms under such a caption.29 Rather, they should be
found in a printed statement conspicuously labeled as "contract
terms," which is their true identity.
Current offer and acceptance analysis finds a contract when the
offeree buyer takes the goods from the shelf, though the buyer is
provided with a power of termination if she chooses to return the
goods. There is no need to torture the reasonable understanding
of the buyer by changing the time of formation with respect to
terms inside the box. If a conspicuous statement alerts the buyer
to "contract terms" inside the box where the terms are again clear-
ly identified as "contract terms," the analysis should recognize a
contract formed when the buyer took the product from the shelf
and paid for it. The buyer's duty under the formed contract, how-
ever, is conditional on the buyer's satisfaction with the vendor's
terms inside the box. Such a condition is an event (the buyer's
satisfaction) that must occur to activate the buyer's existing duty
under the contract that was formed when the buyer took the box
from the shelf and paid the required price. Pursuant to a con
spicuous notice, if the buyer is not satisfied, notice of objection is
293. "Conspicuous" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(10). A statement such as "IMPORTANT
TERMS GOVERNING THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE [COMPANY NAME] AND THE
PURCHASER ARE ENCLOSED" would be sufficient.
294. See, e.g., Magliozzi v. P&T Service Co., 614 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt d, illus. 3 (1981) (concluding that con-
tract terms contained in an "invoice" were not part of the contract).
295. Indeed, an arbitration provision in a pamphlet captioned "User's Guide" should be
deemed procedurally unconscionable, per se.
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224. This characterizes the condition as
precedent. Where the buyer has already paid for the product, however, it may be argued
that the buyer's dissatisfaction with the later revealed terms constitutes an "Event that
Terminates a Duty" under section 230. The Second Restatement no longer refers to such an
event as a "condition subsequent" since it prefers to relegate the term "condition" to condi-
tions precedent. See id. § 224, cmt. e.
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given and the product is returned for a full refund. Under this
analysis, section 2-207 would have no application unless there was
either no statement on the package or the statement was incons-
picuous.
The "contract terms" inside the box must state clearly that the
buyer will be bound by the terms unless the buyer objects to them
within a prescribed time, properly notifies the vendor of such ob-
jection, and returns the contents of the box to the vendor for a
prompt refund.297 The buyer must be allowed sufficient time to
make that decision. When the time for exercising that decision is
exhausted, the condition to the buyer's duty expires and the duty
becomes absolute. The vendor's terms are terms of the contract.
Like boilerplate terms provided before the contract was formed,
the terms inside the box would continue to be subject to claims of
unconscionability.
Where goods are ordered by phone, the buyer should be recog-
nized as the offeror. A clear statement by the order taker concern-
ing contract terms that will be delivered with the goods, such as
the fifteen second statement suggested earlier,298 assures the buy-
er a reasonable opportunity to learn of the vendor's terms. The
statement would be recorded, as phone statements are currently
recorded for marketing reasons, with notice to the caller. The
buyer would be properly characterized as an offeror, and the or-
der-taker's statement would constitute a counter offer. The buy-
er's assent to the counter offer forms a contract, under which the
buyer's duty is conditioned on the buyer's satisfaction with the
vendor's terms that arrive with the goods. As noted earlier, a sim-
ilar scenario has already been illustrated and approved in a recent
Seventh Circuit case.2 9 9
This analysis is consistent with the enforceability of standard
terms in the American Law Institute Principles of Software Con-
tracts, which state that: "to ensure enforcement of their standard
form, software transferors should disclose terms on their website
prior to a transaction and should give reasonable notice and access
to the terms upon initiation of the transfer, whether initiation is
by telephone, Internet or selection in a store."00 It is also consis-
297. The Rhode Island Supreme Court was particularly insistent on this requirement in
DeFontes v. Dell, Inc. 984 A.2d 1061, 1071-73 (R.I. 2009).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
299. See supra note 110; Spivey v. Adaptive Mktg. LLC, 622 F.3d 816, 817, 821 (7th Cir.
2010).
300. PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2010).
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tent with an Internet vendor insisting that the buyer must manif-
est agreement to the vendor's terms since the buyer should not be
bound by "browsewrap" clauses.0 ' The vendor's insistence on
agreement to its terms is a counter offer that the buyer must ac-
cept to download software or to assure shipment of an ordered
product. Again, section 2-207 would have no application since the
buyer would accept the vendor's counter offer to form the contract.
Would these modifications effect a major change in the behavior
of buyers with respect to reading or attempting to understand boi-
lerplate terms? The disclosure requirements of consumer protec-
tion legislation have not yielded the kind of consumer understand-
ing and warranty competition that was predicted. Enhancement
of warranty competition in the sale of goods must be attributed
essentially to market forces, where announcements of a superior
warranty are critical to market entry. If products contained con-
spicuous notices of "contract terms" and the terms inside the box
were also conspicuous and understandable, some additional read-
ing and study of "contract terms" may occur, but a much more im-
portant effect is probable. In addition to alerting buyers to assure
a reasonable opportunity to learn of the terms, vendors may be
more inclined to ascertain that their "contract terms" are competi-
tive in the market, which is a much more important safeguard
against unfair boilerplate terms than the rolling theory provides.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To assure a buyer a reasonable opportunity to become aware of
a vendor's otherwise invisible terms, the confusion, doubt, and
controversy attending the rolling contract theory clearly requires
its rejection. The theory is not only unnecessary to assure effi-
ciency; at a minimum, its failure to alert the buyer to expect later
contract terms undermines the buyer's opportunity to become
aware of such terms. There is no need to continue the deliberate
misconstructions of statutes or precedent that the theory requires.
Nor is it simply a matter of the number of major flaws in the
theory. It is systemically incapable of providing reasonably clear
and effective guidelines. An effective response to the question of
the operative effect of boilerplate terms that accompany the goods
or appear only after the goods have been received should not re-
quire a discussion of several theories. The irrationality and at-
301. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2001)
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tendant confusion of the rolling theory will continue to preclude its
effective assimilation. A confusing legal reaction to the felt needs
of society has no redeeming virtue.

